As many as 50,000 people will descend on the city from all over North America (including Zapatistas from Mexico and the Ruckus Society from Berkeley, California), threatening to paralyse the Pacific port. If things get out of hand, Americans could be watching on television the sort of theatrical street demonstrations not seen since the Vietnam war.
Popular worries are putting globalisation back on the political agenda. Ever since Congress, in 1997, rejected President Clinton's request for "fast track" authority to negotiate trade agreements, American policymakers have become more and more reluctant to endorse economic integration. Earlier this year, the House voted for steel quotas by two to one. The Clinton administration has been wary of agreeing a deal with China over its entry into the WTO, for fear that Congress would reject it. Now the critics of globalisation are starting to influence the campaign for the 2000 election. The two parties have been split on trade since Mr Clinton made the North American Free-Trade Agreement a campaign issue in 1992, but now the issue is widening the gaps within each party, pitting a dwindling band of genuine free-traders against a kaleidoscope of opponents, many of whom are protectionists but some of whom are concerned about matters that go far beyond trade, conventionally defined.
The upshot is unlikely to be outright economic isolationism. So long as there is no deep, painful recession, extremists such as Pat Buchanan have little appeal. But there has already been a rise in protectionism, notably through the use of anti-dumping cases, and there is a danger that political stalemate and a lack of support for open markets could persist beyond the next election.
The remarkable thing about the debate over globalisation is that it is growing more intractable at a time of unprecedented growth. Eight years of boom mean, in conventional wisdom, that voters don't care about economic issues. It is true that the trade deficit is at record highs, though the latest figures are slightly better (see ). It is also true, as Robert Lawrence of the Council of Economic Advisers points out, that parts of manufacturing and agriculture are nearer recession than boom. But new jobs have more than made up the losses and the worst-affected regions-the rust belt and corn belt-have the lowest unemployment rates in the country.
Will Marshall, the head of the Progressive Policy Institute and an influential voice among free-trading Democrats, argues that trade is becoming an issue because it exposes America's latent economic insecurity-fear of losing your job, your pension, your health coverage and so on. There may be something in this. Even with the best economy for decades, support for globalisation is fragile. Opinion polls show large majorities in favour of "acting as a global economic leader". But scratch the surface (or load the question) and opinions split: as many as 46% say that "the US should slow the trend towards globalisation because it hurts American workers." Such popular perceptions are not being reflected in the presidential election. All the mainstream candidates broadly support free trade; Bill Bradley did not moderate his enthusiasm for free trade to prevent the unions from endorsing Al Gore. There are, however, large differences between Mr Gore, who supports linking trade agreements to labour and environmental standards, and George W. Bush, who does not.
So there is nothing obvious in the economy to explain the popular worries and the presidential race is not particularly stoking them. Why, then, the backlash and why the political paralysis? The answer seems to be that trade has become a magnet for new groups and new issues which have changed the nature of the debate and the policymaking process with it.
Once upon a time, trade was exclusively about tariffs and quotas. In America, as elsewhere, it pitted exporters against industries that competed with imports. The argument to expand or restrict trade was largely an economic one, about jobs and prices. And it took place in the context of a superpower rivalry that meant that open trade amongst America's friends commanded bipartisan support.
The superpower rivalry has gone, of course. Business broadly supports free trade, but without much enthusiasm, and there are notable exceptions, such as steel. Far more important, the public debate over trade now embraces issues such as the environment, human rights and labour standards.
These issues have transformed the politics of trade. They have introduced a new element of partisanship into Congress. By and large, Democrats are in favour of having international labour and environmental standards, Republicans are against them. That has made it far harder to find the sort of big bipartisan pro-free-trade majority that used to exist in Congress.
Moreover, the issues have widened existing divisions within each party. The most staunchly pro-free-trade party used to be the Republicans. Now, between a quarter and a third of the party votes against market-opening measures, some because they dislike international bodies such as the WTO , others because they disapprove of linking trade with environmental regulation, still others because they dislike China.
Instead, the most solidly free-trading block is the so-called New Democrats, the centrist group organised by President Clinton and Vice-President Gore. In three recent tests of trading sentiment, they proved the most coherent supporters of liberalisation, with four-fifths of members voting to widen trade, compared to between half or two-thirds of Republicans and only half of all Democrats.
But while this faction has emerged to support liberalisation, backing for free trade has almost collapsed in the rest of the Democratic Party. Mr Clinton got the support of only a fifth of his party for the fast-track vote. As he told the annual gathering of New Democrats last week, the party is united on most "third-way" policies: fiscal conservatism, being tough on crime, education reform. But there is one big exception: "how we're going to respond to globalisation."
Pitted against the free-trading New Democrats are the old ones, where unions retain strong influence (in the past two years, labour has given $12.4m to the Democrats, according to Common Cause, a group which tracks the influence of money in politics). Labour concerns are already showing up in the presidential campaign. Mr Clinton's demand that the WTO take more notice of international labour standards shows the administration's heightened attention to such interests. The New Democrats are seeking to bridge the gap with the rest of the party by stressing such matters as how to keep jobs in the new economy, but so far, to little avail.
The result is sobering. With both parties split and Congress divided on partisan lines, the old certainties of American trade policy have gone. The strength of the economy, while it lasts, militates against outright protectionism, of course. But when a new trade round is just starting, America's lack of commitment to greater liberalisation may be almost as bad.
